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BALANCING AS ART: JUSTICE WHITE AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
William i Wagnel
In more than one key opinion, Justice Byron White cited Justice Robert
H. Jackson's concept of the "art of governing" as the cornerstone of his own
approach to separation-of-powers problems.' In Youngstown Sheet& Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson had written:
The actual artofgo verning under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government.2
This concept of governance as "art," in fact, aptly describes White's vision
of the proper functioning of each branch of the federal government,
including the judicial. The concept usefully describes White's vision of the
proper functioning of the political branches, as well as that of the Court in
resolving separation-of-powers disputes. The art in question is, in both
respects, a quest for the mean in a process of balancing, and not an
observance of formal definitions.3
An adequate understanding of White's separation-of-powers
jurisprudence requires that one understand its terms, on their face, as well
* Professor of Law and Coordinator of the Law, Philosophy and Culture Initiative, The
Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., University of California at
Los Angeles; J.D., Yale University; M.A., The Catholic University of America; Ph.D., The
Catholic University of America.
1. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,760 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 978 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 779 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting).
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
3. See, e.g., Bowsher,478 U.S. at 759 (White, J., dissenting) (expressing disapproval of
the majority's "willingness to interpose its distressingly formalistic view of separation of
powers as a bar to the attainment of governmental objectives through the means chosen by the
Congress and the President in the legislative process established by the Constitution"); See
Matthew James Tanielian, SeparationofPowersandthe Supreme Court' One Doctrine,Two
Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961, 984-85 (1995) (describing Justice White's functional
approach to the separation of powers doctrine). Because "[flunctionalists reject the ideal of
pure separation ...

seeking instead a balanced government ...

facilitated by a creative

blending of the powers of government," they focus on interaction among the branches "rather
than their independence." Keith Werhan, Normalizing the SeparationofPowers,70 TUL. L.
REV. 2681, 2683 (1996).
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as the nature of his objection to his opponents' formalism. 4 These points are

considered in Parts I and II of this essay. But it calls, as well, for
acknowledging a tacit reference in White's position to the judiciary's
accountability for the rule of law. A discussion of this more implicit
dimension of White's reasoning is found in Part III.
Both the credibility of the well-known priority that White's separation-ofpowers jurisprudence accords the legislative branch, and of his claim that
the judiciary can remain a meaningful check on the other branches of
government, ultimately depend upon this final concept of judicial
responsibility to the rule of law. The judiciary, like the other branches,
exercises its check in an exercise of the art of balancing. At the same time,
accountability to the rule of law provides a fundamental constraint on
judicial balancing. This constraint assures White's approach of its ultimate
integrity. A consideration of this implicit reference to the rule of law is
essential to a fair comparison between White's approach and the formalist
alternative.
I. JUSTICE WHITE'S SEPARATION OF POWERS

Justice White's vision of government takes the common good as the end
to be achieved. The mechanisms of government serve to advance that end.
In each case, government action aligns and chooses among available means
to this end. The "correct" answer to the problems facing government is one
of finding the mean, of providing enough, but not too much, of a solution to
advance the end, optimally.5
In the constitutional order, one means toward the end of the common
good-a means procedurally prior to others-is the separation of powers.
Governance is pursued through three power centers, oriented to legislative,
judicial, and executive functions.6 The answer to separation-of-powers
issues is only exceptionally a matter of right and wrong. Ordinarily, the
answer is a matter of finding the mean, i.e., a balance, of providing enough,
but not too much, power to each branch, with due respect to its function and
its relation to the other branches. The judiciary considers claims to power
4.

See Tanielian, supra note 3, at 985 (noting how Justice White "found the standards-

based inquiry to be the proper approach to the separation of powers" and expressed his view
through a series of dissents).
5. "It is [the] distinction between fact and concept, between underlying transaction and
doctrine, that provides critical insight into the jurisprudence of Justice Byron White. White's

philosophy cannot be pinned to a single point on any jurisprudential spectrum .... " Allan
Ides, The JurisprudenceofJustice Byron White, 103 YALE L.J. 419, 419 (1993).

6. Despite the delineation of power into three branches, which is "described with neat
precision in basic civics books," an obvious blending and overlapping occurs, for "as soon as
one looks at this system in action, the formal structure begins to dissolve." Ides, supra note 5,
at 421.
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by the other branches, with the aim of achieving the most effective balance
of power among them. The assessment tends not to focus on right and
wrong, but on greater or lesser effectiveness in bringing about the good.
When the Court has to intervene under the doctrine of judicial review, it is
not because a deontological principle requires it, but because the balance
has tipped.7
In this essentially teleological vision, the legislature necessarily plays a
leading role.8 The legislature discovers and pursues the good and puts it in
programmatic form through generalized rules. When its work is evaluated,
its assessments are found to be more or less apt, as they are more or less
good exercises of legislative art. More or less effective, they can rarely be
considered entirely wrong. 9 They are at most unwise, and the remedy for
unwise rules is, ordinarily, trial and error by the same body.
The executive is not essentially different. Unlike the legislative branch,
the executive is act-oriented, working on programs assigned to it by
another, rather than promulgating general programs. But even here, the
issue is: does the executive have enough, but not too much, power to
optimize the good? Again, executive actions are generally more or less
wise, rather than right or wrong, and the solution to less wise executive
action is trial and error. Voting serves as the mechanism to validate the
relative quality of results of executive action.
In this vision there is no essential difference between the separation of
powers and any other means suited to advancing the good. Additionally,
there is no reason that the separation of powers need exist exclusively at the
level of constitutional principle. The legislature can continue to elaborate
7. Justice White describes the role of the judicial branch: "Article III is not to be read
out of the Constitution; rather, it should be read as expressing one value that must be balanced
against competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities. This Court retains the
final word on how that balance is to be struck." N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 113 (1982). Where the Court does strike down a claim of another branch, it
will be, according to White, in the form of moderating the demand of the other branch, rather
than invalidity per se. Similarly, even though White voted against absolute immunity, he
recognized qualified immunity in other cases. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,790
(1982) (White, J., dissenting); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 821-22 (1982); Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 (1985).
8. See Charles Fried, A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REv. 20,24
(1993) (describing Justice White's views on separation of powers as "distinctly parliamentary,"
as the "legislative veto, Gramm-Rudman hammer, and legislative representation in the
Federal Election Commission, which the Court struck down in Buckley, White thought valid
because congressional action in canonical form instituted them").
9. "It is long settled that Congress may exercise its best judgment in the selection of
measures, to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government, and avail itself
of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances."
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,984 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415-16,420 (1819)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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on the separation-of-powers principle as a transient means of pursuing the
good as it assigns statutorily enacted roles to the respective branches, under
changing circumstances. Thus, the judiciary encounters the separation-ofpowers implications of a legislative act twice: first on the level of
constitutional requirement, and second on the level of legislative
accommodation. Although the requirements of the Constitution are
privileged, when the judiciary encounters legislative separation-of-powers
issues, it considers how far the legislature may go beyond-or even in
apparent contravention of-the literal constitutional text in choosing its
means. Once again, the issue is one of enough but not too much, rather
than per se right or wrong.
The judiciary's analysis of the actions of Congress and its development of
separation-of-powers principles has a foundation in the constitutional text,
which assigns roles to the branches. Here the privileged position of the text
is not because it contains an invariant principle, but because it enshrines a
prudential judgment of the Founders. The constitutional text reflects a
presumption in favor of the efficiency of certain means. For example,
because the Founders incorporated judgments about the most efficacious
allocation of the appointment power into the Constitution,' Justice White
struck down actions of Congress deviating from that prudential judgment."
The distribution of power in the constitutional text does not point to a
philosophical principle, but rather indicates the Framers' judgment that in
the dynamic of balanced competition among branches, the executive
needed a lock on aspects of the appointments prerogative. Here, the scope
of each branch's function is set with an aprioriprudential judgment about
the optimal interaction among the three.
Where such textual assignment of detail is not present, however, the
legislature itself can enact structural arrangements as a means to advance
10. U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 2, cl. 2.
11. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 267-82 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). "[N]o case in this Court even remotely supports the power of Congress to
appoint an officer of the United States aside from those officers each House is authorized by
Art. I to appoint to assist in the legislative processes." Id. at 275.
12. See Buckley v. Valeo for an elaboration on the debate surrounding the
Appointments Clause:
The language of the Appointments Clause was not mere inadvertence. The Framers
repeatedly debated the matter of the appointment of officers of the new Federal
Government. They reached the final formulation of the Clause only after the most
careful debate and consideration of its place in the overall design of government ....
The separation-of-powers principle was implemented by a series of provisions,
among which was the knowing decision that Congress was to have no power
whatsoever to appoint federal officers, except for the power of each House to
appoint its own officers serving in the strictly legislative processes and for the
confirming power of the Senate alone.
Id. at 271-72.
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the most effective balance among the powers.13 This legislative judgment
can serve both to assign and check powers. Congress's control over certain
means is not specifically acknowledged in the constitutional text, but was
later approved by the Court with its affirmation of the activist state amidst
the Great Depression. But the Court did not accord Congress unrestricted
control over these means, it still checks Congress by scrutinizing whether in
acting in any particular case, Congress is aggrandizing itself at the expense
of another branch. Justice White gave Congress the benefit of the doubt in
his examination of legislative measures for evidence of aggrandizement.
Several examples illustrate White's willingness, in the absence of
constitutional assignment, to let Congress make judgments about
separation-of-powers issues. For example, White, in his Chadhadissent,
found that Congress may give the deportation of aliens-a traditionally
legislative function-to the executive branch, and simultaneously check the
executive in this role by means of a one-house veto. 4 White found no
principled objection to the plan, and no disqualifying motive on the part of
Congress to aggrandize itself. 5 In parallel fashion, White's Northern
Pipeline dissent concluded that Congress may create extensive Article I
courts such as bankruptcy courts, subject only to legislative assessments of
appropriate procedure and unencumbered by the requirements binding on
Article III courts such as the jury.16 In Bowshar v. Synar, White argued,
Congress may empower the executive branch to enforce budgetary

13. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-74 (White, J., dissenting) (describing the virtues of the
legislative veto).
14. See generally id. at 967-1003. In the face of constitutional silence on the legislative
veto at issue in Chadha, White wrote, the Court's task was to "determine whether the
legislative veto is consistent with the purposes of Art. I and the principles of separation of
powers which are reflected in that Article and throughout the Constitution." Id.at 977-78. To
infer disapproval from silence would negate the flexibility given to the federal government by
the Founders. See id.at 978.
15. "The history of the legislative veto also makes clear that it has not been a sword with
which Congress has struck out to aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches-the
concerns of Madison and Hamilton." Id. at 974.
16. In NorthernPipeline Construction Co. v. MarathonPipeLine Co., White dissented
from the majority's holding that certain kinds of claims could only be adjudicated by judges
with Article III independence. Seegenerally458U.S. 50,92-118 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
Because the Court had historically approved of legislative activity, White concluded that
"[t]here is no difference in principle between the work that Congress may assign to an Art. I
court and that which the Constitution assigns to Art. III courts." Id. at 113. In
Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg,concerning a claimed right to a jury, White wrote that "the
determination whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial on petitioners' claims
must turn on two questions: first, in what forum will those claims be heard; and second, what is
the nature of those claims." 492 U.S. 33, 78-79 (1989) (White, J., dissenting). White wrote
that the majority ignored the first requirement, and therefore ignored Congress' ability to
create fora with limited procedural rights. Id. at 84.
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discipline and simultaneously check the executive's exercise of that power

by retaining power to remove that officer."17
In a parallel vein, White endorsed allowing Congress to resolve division

of powers issues arising between federal and state or local authorities. For
instance, he found that Congress may delegate oversight over airports
serving the District of Columbia to local political authorities, while
continuing to appoint members of Congress to serve in the oversight
process and to stipulate how the local authorities are to do their work.' He
likewise supported the validity of congressional balancing in the areas of
IS
20
interstate compacts'9 and federal
preemption.

Where he encountered silence in the constitutional text, Justice White
consistently deferred to congressional judgments on the best structure and

functioning of government. The judiciary's role in these cases was simply to
unmask any congressional attempts to deprive another branch of its

constitutional power, not to apply formulaic rules. White's rejection of such
rules is examined in the next section.
II.

JUSTICE WHITE'S CRITIQUE OF FORMALISM

In contrast to his functionalism, Justice White's opponents followed a
formalistic approach to separation-of-powers concerns. 2 ' Formalist

approaches create a broader role for the judiciary to strike down actions of
the legislature and the executive, where the legislature or executive deviate

17. "I cannot accept.., that the exercise of authority by an officer removable for cause
by a joint resolution of Congress is analogous to the impermissible execution of the law by
Congress itself.
." Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 765 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 776 (asserting that the majority's decision "strike[s] down a statute posing no real
danger of aggrandizement of congressional power").
18. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,
501 U.S. 252,286-92 (1991) (White, J., dissenting); see also id. at 286 ("It is absurd to suggest
that the Board's power represents the type of legislative usurpatio[n] ... that concerned the
Framers.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,189 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("To read the Court's version of events ... one would think that
Congress was the sole proponent of a solution to the Nation's low-level radioactive waste
problem. Not so. The [statutes at issue] resulted from the efforts of state leaders to achieve a
state-based set of remedies to the waste problem."); United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 490 (.1978) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's
approval of a state compact formed without congressional approval "fails to provide the
ongoing congressional oversight that is part of the Compact Clause's protections").
20. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 202-23 (1983) (finding that California regulations on nuclear power plants were not
preempted by congressional action).
21.
See Bowsher,478 U.S. at 759 (White, J., dissenting) ("I will, however, address the
wisdom of the Court's willingness to interpose its distressingly formalistic view of separation of
powers as a bar to the attainment of governmental objectives .... ").
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from the nature of their respective roles. 2 Formalism tends to strike down
legislative additions to constitutionally-based separation of power
structures, whether those additions take the form of congressional grants or
checks on power.
In each case, the formalist rationale for the holding is that the
congressional addition violates a principle or form found in the text, or that
of the
the action contradicts the Founders' intent; the consequences
S21
addition, or of a judicial invalidation of the addition, are irrelevant. White
repeatedly observed that formalists intervened to strike down laws where
consequences in the form of the usurpation of power or loss of freedom did
not require it.
A triumphant instance of formalism was Chadha,which universalized the
procedures of bicameralism and presentment as requirements of all
legislative action.24 Once that universalization had taken place, the
retention of a one-house veto was per se invalid. 25 Against this finding,
Justice White noted that the one-house veto worked, and that it had been
embedded in "nearly 200 statutes."26 While formalists claim to find
justification in the text, White argued that they do not, and cannot, find the
definitive scope of a provision in the text alone.27 The adequacy of the text
is illusory.28 The majority arbitrarily ignored both a supplemental
normative judgment appropriately made by Congress at the time of the
Depression, and the cumulative evidence on the function performed by the
21
one-house veto.
22. For example, see Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Chadha: "The hydraulic
pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power,
even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,951
(1983).
23. On Justice White's concern for consequences, see his Chadhadissent:
Without the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson's choice: either to
refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of
writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances
across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its law-making
function to the Executive Branch and independent agencies. To choose the former
leaves major national problems unresolved; to opt for the latter risks unaccountable
policymaking by those not elected to fill that role.
dissenting).
Id.at 968 (White, J.,
24. Jd.at 951 (opinion of the Court).
25. Id.at 956-57.
dissenting).
26. Id.at 967-68 (White, J.,
27. See id.at 977 ("The Constitution does not directly authorize or prohibit the
legislative veto.").
28. Id.
29. White explained that the legislative veto came about in order to assist reorganization
of government after the Depression, as a "means by which Congress could confer additional
at 969.
authority [on the executive] while preserving its own constitutional role." Id.
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UnitedStates v. Brown" can be read in a parallel fashion. In Brown, the
majority interpreted the Bill of Attainder Clause3 as implementing the
separation of powers." It held that the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, barring anyone who had been a member of the
Communist Party during the preceding five years from serving on the
executive board of a labor organization, was an unconstitutional bill of
attainder.33 The Court interpreted the bill of attainder prohibition as
preventing legislative rules applicable to "easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial
trial. 3 4 In other words, the Court concluded that the Act was a departure
from the legislative function of making general rules, even if the Act was
not retributive." According to White, the majority found the Act
unconstitutional because of its over- and under-inclusiveness.36
Justice White objected to this reasoning, finding-through close textual
arguments-insufficient reason to suppose that the bill of attainder
prohibition implicated a general separation-of-powers principle.37 The fact
that the Bill of Attainder Clause generally contributed to separation of
powers did not support the broad inference made by the majority." White
found that inference inconsistent with the Court's decisions in other cases.39
He believed that appropriate deference to step-by-step problem solving on
the part of Congress made it impossible for the Court to find any punitive
purpose to the Act. 40 White argued that the majority ignored a tradition of
reading the bill of attainder prohibition as a discrete problem, rather than as
a basis for generic separation-of-powers distinctions.4

30. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
3.
32. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 442 ("[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a
narrow, technical.., prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers,
a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function ....

33. Id.
at 440.
34.
35.

Id.at 448-49 (quoting United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946)).
Id. at 450 ("The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule...."); see also

id.
at 458 ("Historical considerations by no means compel restriction of the bill of attainder
ban to instances of retribution.").
36. Id at 464 (White, J., dissenting).

37. Id.
at 472-73.
38. Id.
(conceding that "the prohibition on bills of attainder is a judicially enforceable
restraint on legislative power and therefore constitutes one among the many mechanisms
implementing the separation of powers," but asserting that "that conclusion is the most that
can be gleaned from the authorities cited by the Court").

39. Id at 464-72.
40. Id.
at 475-78.
41. See id.
at 463 ("In this case, however, the Court discards this meticulous multifold
analysis that has been deemed necessary in the past.").
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White's dissent in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. rested on similar
reasoning.42 There, Congress transferred operating control over National
Airport and Dulles International Airport from the federal government to
the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, a compact between
Virginia and the District of Columbia. The transfer was conditioned on a
provision that a board of review made up of congressmen retain veto power
over the Authority's decisions.4 ' The Court found that the arrangement
violated separation-of-powers principles." The majority held that Chadha's
procedural requirements applied to protect against legislative incursion
upon the executive, in this case, a state-createdexecutive organ.45
White's critique established that the majority strained to create an
unprecedented separation-of-powers issue by invoking the doctrine as a
basis for ruling on the delegation of power to a state.4 6 The Court easily
could have avoided the issue under South Dakota v. Dole,7 as the states
constitutionally could have created the arrangement themselves. 4' Having
arbitrarily created the separation-of-powers issue, White argued, the
majority asserted, but did not establish, that the board of review was
exercising a legislative function required to meet Chadha's procedural
requirements.4 9 The majority again asserted, but did not establish, that the
board was impermissibly exercising an executive function while
simultaneously falling under Congress's control. 0 Nor, White argued, did
the Court's ruling create logical consistency with the preceding series of
formalist majority opinions."
In Bowsher v. Synar, the majority struck down the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act, which charged the Comptroller General with the executive
task of independently evaluating budget reductions recommended by the
Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget:
Congress retained the power of removal for cause.52 In contrast to Buckley

42. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
43. Id. at 255.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 275-77.
46. "For the first time in its history, the Court employs separation-of-powers doctrine to
invalidate a body created under state law." Id. at 278 (White, J., dissenting).
47. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
48. 501 U.S. at 285 (White, J., dissenting) ("There is no question that Dole, when
faithfully read, places the Board outside the scope of separation-of-powers scrutiny.").
49. Id. at 290 (criticizing the majority on the basis that "if the Board is exercising federal
power, its power is not legislative").
50. Id. at 286-90.
51. See id. at 290.
52. 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986).
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v. Valeo,53 the retention by Congress of a check under Gramm-RudmanHollings did not violate a textual restriction." The Court in other cases had
said that the Congress could restrict the President's removal power.5 The
majority concluded that, even though the removal provision satisfied the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Chadha,it violated another
formalistic principle derived from the text." White labelled the Court's
ruling "distressingly formalistic 5 17 and "rigid dogma,, 58 in response to a
legislative threat that was "wholly chimerical. 59 White saw no threat of
legislative aggrandizement;"' not only was there no positive evidence of
aggrandizement, but the officer in question remained "one of the most
independent officers in the entire federal establishment."6
Justice White consistently took his formalist opponents to task for
invalidating legislation that complied with all relevant constitutional
requirements. He repeatedly asserted that formalistic principles could not
be supported by reference to the text of the Constitution. Not only did he
disagree with the particular principles put forward by the majority in these
cases, he disagreed with the very idea that the judicial task was to check the
other branches by deriving such principles. His vision of the judicial check
is the subject of the next section.
III. WHITE'S ALTERNATIVE VERSION OF THE JUDICIAL CHECK
White's critique of formalism reinforces his own alternative vision of the
legislative art. It affirms his preference for assessing the validity of
legislative judgments in prudential terms, as discussed above, but it also
suggests a generally principled limit on the legislative and executive
branches of government that stands as an alternative to the formal
structures of his opponents. This alternative is respect for the rule of law.

53. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
54. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 765 (White, J., dissenting) ("Buckley, however, was

grounded on a textually based separation-of-powers argument .... ").
55. See id. at 724-26 (opinion of the Court) (discussing Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States.
295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958)).
56. "The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it
follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess." Id.
at 726.
57.

Id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting).

58. Id. at 776.
59. Id. at 774.
60. "It is evident ... that the powers exercised by the Comptroller General under the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act are not such that vesting them in an officer not subject to
removal at will by the President would in itself improperly interfere with Presidential powers."
Id. at 763.
61. Id. at 773.
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A. Procedure:The Court'sAssertion of the Power of JudicialReview
Serves to Establish the Rule of Law
In championing an expansive conception of judicial review, White affirms
a principled basis, of a procedural kind, for a judicial check on the other
branches of the federal government. He does so in at least two ways. He
limits the scope of the political question doctrine and he rejects claims to
various forms of immunity from judicial review.62
1. Justiciability
White's narrow reading of the political question doctrine can be seen in
his concurrence in Nixon v. United States. 63 The majority in the case
formalistically asserted that the Senate's right to try an impeachment is not
reviewable. 64 It held that the constitutional text gives the Senate "sole"
authority in trying impeachments, 6 and that no judicially manageable
standards existed that would have permitted the Court to review the
Senate's interpretation of the word "try. 66 Though he ultimately concluded
that the Senate's procedures complied with the Constitution, Justice White
asserted that the Senate's action was reviewable.67
In regard to the executive branch, White asserted the same breadth of
justiciability in the context of the "act of state doctrine" under international
law. Due attention to executive branch concerns was, for Justice White,
compatible with continuing justiciability. 68 Or, in Department of the Na vy
v. Egan, the grant or denial of a security clearance-in the absence of an

62.

A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION

187 (5th ed. 1897) ("We may say that the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the
ground that the general principles of the constitution ... are with us the result of judicial
decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the
Courts....").
63. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).

64. See id.at 238.
65.

Id at 229 ("[T~he word 'sole' indicates that this authority is reposed in the Senate and

6).
nowhere else.") (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.
66. See id. at 229-30.
67. "I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore
completely the constitutional direction to 'try' impeachment cases." Id. at 239 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
68. Justice White wrote:
Without doubt political matters in the realm of foreign affairs are within the
exclusive domain of the Executive Branch ....But this is far from saying that the
Constitution vests in the executive exclusive absolute control of foreign affairs or
that the validity of a foreign act of state is necessarily a political question.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,461 (1964) (White, J., dissenting); see also
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,690-95 (1976) (finding that
the burden of establishing an "act of state" defense had not been met).
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expression of congressional intent to the contrary-remained reviewable.69
White interpreted the power of review broadly, so that when the Court
heard a case, he rejected the idea that implying remedies raised separationof-powers concerns. Thus, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County PublicSchools,
Justice White, writing for the majority, refused to restrict the judiciary's
prerogative to imply a damages remedy.7 °
2. Restriction of Executive and Legislative Immunity
A correlated theme can be seen in White's inclination to narrow the
doctrine of executive immunity from civil suits. White dissented in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,holding that the President has absolute immunity from civil suit
for any act undertaken within the "outer perimeter" of his duties of office,"
and he concurred in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,denying such absolute immunity
to executive aides.72 He wrote the majority opinion in Mitchell v. Forsyth,
justifying a holding that Cabinet officers or other high executive officers,
such as the Attorney General of the United States, did not have absolute
immunity from civil actions.73
In Gravel v. United States, Justice White, writing for the majority,
addressed the issue of legislative immunity. 4 Gravelheld, in connection
with the Pentagon Papers case, that Speech or Debate Clause immunity for
legislative aides did not extend to required appearances before grand juries
regarding the source of documents in possession of a member of Congress,
as long as the aides were not questioned about the legislative process itself.75
For Justice White, a principled basis for the judiciary's check on Congress
and the President is that both are to remain subject to the scrutiny of
judicial review, even though he envisions such scrutiny as generally
occurring by means of prudential balancing in the place of formalist
definitions. He stresses this principled importance of judicial review in
cases such as Bowsher v. Synar,even as he rejects the asserted bright lines
of formalism.76 White rejects limits on the judiciary which would interfere
69. See 484 U.S. 518, 538 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
70. 503 U.S. 60,73-74 (1992) ("Unlike the finding of a cause of action, which authorizes a
court to hear a case or controversy, the discretion to award appropriate relief involves no such
increase in judicial power.").
71. Seegenerally457 U.S. 731 (1982).
72. 457 U.S. 800, 821-22 (1982).
73. "We do not believe that the security of the Republic will be threatened if its Attorney
General is given incentives to abide by clearly established law." 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985).
74. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
75. Id. at 627-29.
76. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,776 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("Reliance on such
an unyielding principle to strike down a statute posing no real danger of aggrandizement of
congressional power is extremely misguided and insensitive to our constitutionalrole.")
(emphasis added).
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with the rule of law by arbitrarily restricting the scope of justiciable
disputes, but he accepts limits on the judiciary aimed at the integrity of its
functioning. An example of the latter is seen in Justice White's broad
reading of the jury requirement in Bloom v. Ilinoisi' Legislatures can

require judges to use juries in certain cases as a legislative check on the
judiciary. 8
B. Substance: The Court'sReview of the Rationalityof the Judgments
of the OtherBranchesHas Teeth
Though White wanted to allow Congress to experiment with a free range
of reasonable options, he also viewed Congress as subject to the judicial
check, if its experiments crossed into irrationality. This limit is encountered
not when one branch of government encroaches on the turf of another, but
when a governmental entity, in either political branch, oversteps the rights
of a private litigant. Separation-of-powers concerns arise as the Court
adjudicates private claims.
Several examples are illustrative. In his majority opinion in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., White pointed out that an
ordinance requiring a special permit for a home for the "feebleminded"
rested on an "irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded., 79 And,
concurring in Furman v. Georgia,White argued that the random application
of the death penalty as delegated to juries could not rationally satisfy the
Eighth Amendment.
Dissenting in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
White asserted that the Texas school financing system, which left some
districts without sufficient means to support the education of their children,
where
case,
existsrejected,
in the Pentagon
basis."
parallel
had
nowas
rational
that the
executive
the claimPapers
of,Aand
ultimately
White
skeptical

77. 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (White, J.)(upholding the right to a jury in criminal contempt
cases with severe penalties). "[DJispensing with the jury in the trial of contempt subjected to
severe punishment represents an unacceptable construction of the Constitution, 'an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by the [courts] which no lapse of time of respectable
array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."' Id. at 198 (quoting Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518,533 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
at 207.
78. See id.
79. 473 U.S. 432, 432, 450 (1985).
80. See generally 408 U.S. 238, 310-14 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the

infrequency with which juries apply the death penalty makes its rare application one without a
rational basis).
81. 411 U.S. 1, 68 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for not requiring
the state to show "that the means chosen to effectuate [the state's educational] goal are

rationally related to its achievement," thus making equal protection analysis "no more than an
empty gesture").
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needed 8the
remedy of prior restraint of expression for the sake of national
2

security.

C. The JudicialArt of Assessing Legislative RationalityMust Satisfy the
Rule ofLa w
Justice White acknowledged that judicial departures from a stance of
deference to the legislature created separation-of-powers conflicts. In this
context, he believed that the Court could avoid violating the proper balance
of powers by applying judicial art. The necessary safeguard was not to be
found in a formalist view of the judicial role, but in judicial art itself. The
Court was to peg its judgment of whether the other branch had overstepped
its bounds on some demonstrable criteria of rationality.
Thus, White was prepared to apply heightened due process review only3
where there is a clear tradition of doing so, as in Griswold v. Connecticut

In Griswoldhe wrote, "[s]urely the right invoked in this case, to be free of
regulation of the intimacies of the marriage relationship, 'come[s] to this
Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to
liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements."'4 In
the absence of such a tradition, he did not apply heightened scrutiny in
5 or Bowers v.
either City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc."
Hardwick.6

Similarly, White was unwilling to permit the judiciary to intervene to
strike down a state statute unless he found clear congressional intent
requiring the judiciary to do so. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
EnergyResources ConservationandDevelopment Commission,he found
that a California statute was not pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act
partially because he concluded that it was Congress' job to promulgate and
protect federal policies, and Congress had not spoken.87

82. "What is more, terminating the ban on publication of the relatively few sensitive
documents the Government now seeks to suppress does not mean that the law either requires
or invites newspapers or others to publish them or that they will be immune from criminal
action if they do." N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring).
83. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
84. Id. at 502-03 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
85. See 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
86. See 478 U.S. 186, 1,90-91 (1986).
87. "[l]t is for Congress to rethink the division of regulatory authority in light of its
possible exercise by the States to undercut a federal objective. The courts should not assume
the role which our system assigns to Congress." 461 U.S. 190, 223 (1983).
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In a parallel manner, White required a showing of intentional
discrimination before finding a violation of equal protection, as he
explained
81
in both Washington v. Davi? and Rogers v. Lodge. In addition to a
showing of intent, he required a demonstration of concrete disadvantage
before striking down political gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer,9 He
was aware that, without limitation, the Court's scrutiny of the work of other
branches would distort the constitutional system of separation of powers.
But, he believed that the limits on that scrutiny were not to be found
formally within the text of Article III. Rather, he held that they arose as
intrinsic criteria of its sound exercise within the rule of law.
IV.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

It has often been said that White excelled in setting forth a skeptical
critique of the positions of others, but exhibited a certain modesty when
making the terms of his own approach explicit. This diffidence can perhaps
be traced biographically to his desire to move beyond his early celebrity as
an NFL football star. A review of his separation-of-powers jurisprudence,
however, exposes a judicial philosophy that is, at the least, remarkably
coherent, and that merits being considered in its own light.
It is true that White propounds an expansive role for the legislature
within the constitutional order of the activist state, and that the role he
accords the judiciary is one that will not often lead it to overturn the actions
of another branch. But, the commitment to the rule of law that undergirds
White's approach ensures that, in the end, it is not only flexible but
principled.
In the patchwork represented by separation-of-powers
precedents, with its vacillating rationales and compromises, he offers a
coherent view and challenges his formalist adversaries to do the same.

88.
89.
90.

426 U.S. 229,242 (1976).
458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982).
"Rather, unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is

arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on
the political process as a whole." 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (White, J., plurality opinion).
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